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Oil rents and institutional quality: empirical evidence from
Algeria

Chekouri Sidi Mohammed1, Benbouziane Mohamed2, Chibi Abderrahim3

Abstract
This paper examines the interaction between natural resource abundance and institutional
quality in Algeria, using two measures of institutional quality (corruption and democratic
accountability), and a measures for resource endowment (oil rents as a percentage of GDP).
Our results indicate that an increase in oil rents significantly increase corruption in Algeria,
while the interaction effect between oil rents and democratic accountability is positive and
statistically significant, which means that enhancing democratic institutions can reduce
corruption. It is also revealed that the manufactures exports significantly decline in the
aftermath of oil rents shock, a pattern consistent with the Dutch Disease phenomenon. On the
one hand, these findings confirms that Algeria’s institutional framework demonstrates a high
degree of perceived weakness, and on the other hand, enhancing these institutional
environment would reduce corruption, and increase the impact of resource abundance on
economic development.
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1. Introduction
Many natural resource exporters, and specifically oil countries are suffering from the
Resource Curse, and are thus unable to develop sectors outside the production and the export
of raw materials. In fact, both Economists and political scientists have agreed that the
fundamental cause of poor economic performance and hence resource curse, in resource
abundant countries (including oil countries) has been poor quality of domestic institutions.
Moreover, the idea about the decisive role of institutions in determining whether the abundant
of natural resource are a blessing or a curse has found more support in numerous studies (e.g.,
Acemoglu, 2001; Tornell and Lane, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2005; Mehlum, Moene and
Torvik, 2006; Boschini et al.2007; Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier,2006; Ross, 2012), also, the
experience of several resource-rich countries confirms this. Experiences show, however, that
resource-rich countries that have successfully escaped the curse problem, are those countries
that have implemented a good institutions such as Botswana and Norway. Whereas other
unsuccessful resource-rich countries like Nigeria, Angola and Algeria, have completely failed
to address the curse, as well as they share especially a common weak institutional
environments.
Algeria is an excellent example of a country that has an abundance of and depend
heavily on revenues from hydrocarbon exports in particular; and, on the other hand, has failed
to use their revenues to diversify their economic base. Algeria is one of the major exporters of
oil and gas in Africa. It is the 14th largest world exporter of oil, and is the sixth-largest gas
producer.
Algeria’s government revenues has increased greatly over recent years, due to the
sustained surge in oil price that began in 1999. It has invested more than US$ 500 billion of
these revenues since 2000, an amount greater of that used by the Marshall plan in rebuilding
Europe after World War Two. However, these resource revenues have enabled Algeria to
achieve macroeconomic stability, to reimburse their external debt, to reduce unemployment
through employment young population in the public sector, and to buy a sort of social peace
through rent distribution to citizens. On the other hand, this massive inflows of revenues have
caused a number of negative effects on the Algerian economy, for instance, a dramatic decline
in the production and exports of other economic sectors (caused by the Dutch Disease effect),
waste and mismanagement of resource revenues, and consistent with the focus of this study,
weak and corrupt institutions.
In this paper, we study the interplay between natural resource abundance and
institutional quality in Algeria. Our analysis show that Algeria’s institutional framework
2
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demonstrates a high degree of perceived weakness, and that it is the failure of the institutional
framework that constitute the most important challenge facing Algerian economy. That is why
it is important for Algeria to implement major reforms of their institutions to insure effective
and transparent management of oil revenues.
This paper is organized in six sections in addition to the introduction. Section Two
summarizes the theoretical framework of the resource curse and its main explanations, by
focussing mainly on political and institutional explanations that have been advanced to this
phenomenon, and reviews very briefly some existing economic literature reliant resources and
institutions. Section three offers an overview of key characteristic of the Algerian economy, in
addition to a detailed analysis of Algeria’s institutional framework. Section four describes the
data and methodology employed in the empirical estimation. Section five presents the results
and discussions. Section six discusses the importance of building strong institutional
framework in escaping problems related to the curse, and evaluates the experience of Algeria
in this context. Section seven concludes.

2. The Resource Curse, theory and literature review
Natural resource abundance has traditionally viewed as a positive determinant of
economic development. The empirical support of this view dates back to the late of nineteenth
century, where a number of advanced nations endowed with natural resources such as the
United States, Britain, Canada, and Australia, experienced particularly rapid industrial
development. But, since the 1960s, the experiences of numerous countries that have wellendowed show that the abundance of natural resources do not always lead to increased
economic development.
Most recent studies have shown that developing countries with more natural resources
tend to have lower rates of growth and underperforms economically and socially compared
with resource poor countries. For example, many resource abundant countries in Africa, the
Middle East, and Latin America are experiencing less economic performance compared with
resource deficient countries such as Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. This
puzzling phenomenon became known as the Natural Resource Curse. In fact, The so-called
“Natural Resource Curse” suggests that there exists a negative relationship between
endowment with natural resources and social and economic development (e.g., Auty, 1993;
Sachs and Warner, 1995,1997, 2001).
The concern about the resource curse concept dates back to the middle of sixteenth
century. In 1576 the French political philosopher Jean Bodin (1576) claimed that:“men of a
3
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fat and fertile soil, are most commonly effeminate and cowards; whereas contrariwise a
barren country make men temperate by necessity, and by consequence careful, vigilant, and
industrious (As cited in Sachs and Warner (1995))”, means that laziness and sloth is concomitant
with resource-abundance. In the eighteenth century, Adam Smith (1776) in his “Wealth of
Nations” also showed that projects of mining was a bad use of capital, and should be
discouraged: “Projects of mining, instead of replacing the capital employed in them, together
with the ordinary profits of stock, commonly absorb both capital and stock. They are the
projects, therefore, to which of all others a prudent law-giver, who desired to increase the
capital of his nation, would least chuse to give any extraordinary encouragement...” (2005, p.
453).
In the 1970s after the first oil price shocks, scholars in development economics have
devoted considerable attention to the impact of massive inflow of resource revenues on
petroleum-producing countries. However, the term “Resource Curse” was first used by
Richard M. Auty (1993, 2001) to describe this paradoxical

Since then, sufficiently large body of theoretical and empirical work on these question,
such as Gelb(1989), Sachs and Waner (1999, 2001), Gylfason, (2001), Ross (2001), Sala-iMartin and Subramanian (2003), Paul Stevens (2003), Karl Terry Lynn (1997), and others,
have confirmed the inverse correlation between economic growth and the presence of
abundant deposits of natural resources. Further, much of these works have indicated that weak
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social and economic development, poverty and inequality, political problems, and civil
conflict are particularly evident in almost resource rich countries.
Theoretical literature and empirical studies have proposed a wide number of explanations for
these puzzling phenomenon that affect countries with great natural resource wealth, and
undermines their abilities to achieve sustainable growth and development. In this section, we
briefly review the main explanations for the resource curse:
(i) The earlier explanation of the resource curse and the most famous one was the
Dutch Disease Theory (Corden and Neary, 1982; Corden, 1984; van Wijnbergen,1984 ; Neary
and van Wijnbergen,1986 ). As is well known in the literature, the Dutch Disease
phenomenon was first observed in the Netherland in the 1960s, when the discovery and
exploitation of large reserves of natural gas in the North Sea led real exchange rate to rise,
negatively affecting the Dutch agricultural and manufacturing exporting sectors, and thus
lowering overall economic growth.
As Corden (1984) suggests, Dutch Disease adversely affect economic growth through
two channels. First, the appreciation of a country’s real exchange rate (as the relative price of
non-tradables to tradables) caused by a rise in the world price of resource; and second, the
shift of mobile factors (capital and labor) out of country’s manufacturing and agricultural
sectors toward booming resource sector, declining manufacturing exports as a result.
As a consequences, together these effects hinder the manufacturing sector, assumed as the
main driving force of economic growth, because, as shown by Sachs and Warner (1997) the
manufacturing is characterising by larger positive externalities in production than other forms
of economic activity, and the shrinkage of this sector caused by the Dutch Disease can lead to
decline in growth.
Indeed, the evidence for the Dutch disease as promising explanations for the resource
curse is mixed. A numerous empirical studies (Gelb, 1989; Auty, 1990; Fardmanesh, 1991;
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003) have shown that developing countries rich in natural
resource do not necessarily suffer from the symptoms of Dutch Disease, especially the
moving of labor and capital from manufacturing sector to booming resource sector. Since then
other variables and mechanisms have been identified as alternative channels that abundance
of natural resources cause reduction of economic growth via them.
(ii) The emerging consensus is that resource wealth itself is not necessarily harmful for
growth and development, but it is the matter of the volatility existing in the prices of oil and
other minerals products. Several studies, such as, Auty (2001), Arezki and Gylfason (2011),
Van der Ploeg and Poelhekk (2008), and Jeffry Frankel (2012) argue that the high volatility of
5
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natural resources prices represent an important transmission mechanism for the “resource
curse”, and that volatility increases the volatility of both government expenditures and
exchange rate in high rent countries.
(iii) Other studies (Gelb, 1989; Auty and Gelb, 2001) suggest that Pro-cyclical of
government expenditures have been among the importance economical factor suggested to
explain the weak economic performance and lower economic growth of many oil centred
economies. In this sense, Lane (2003) and Bleany and Halland (2009) consider that the high
volatility of public revenues - as oil revenues in oil exporting countries – and hence procyclical government expenditures represent an important transmission mechanism for the
“resource curse”.
(iv) According to several authors among them Gylfason (2001b), natural resources
reduce public spending on education and crowd out human capital, which then jeopardise the
pace of economic development. For, Birdsall, Pinckney and Sabot (2004) the abundance of
natural resources break the virtuous cycle between reduced inequalities, human capital
accumulation and economic growth.
(v) A number of studies (Mc Mahon, 1997; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003)
have shown that mineral and oil rich countries tend to favor military project and unproductive
and inefficient investments, or what are often called the famous White Elephants that is
expensive but unnecessary projects, undertaken because they are politically beneficial to those
who promote them. There is evidence that resource abundance economies make significant
investments in infrastructure and the domestic economy even in the presence of corruption
and mismanagement, which reduce investment efficiency and retard diversification (Auty and
Gelb, 2001).
(vi) A large number of studies have presented evidence to suggest that the major
problems created by the abundance of particular resources, referred to as the resource curse,
are mostly related to the quality of institutions (e.g., Tornell and Lane, 1999; Acemoglue et
al., 2005;

Ross, 2012).

Many researchers relate the curse to the negative effect of resources on the quality of
political institutions, particularly that of democracy, and that constrain the executive and
secure political accountability. For instance, Fernanda Brollo and others (2010) argue that the
windfall of natural resources can have further adverse effects on economic performance in
resource rich developing countries, because they worsen the functioning of institutions, and
deteriorate the quality of political elites. Ross (2001b) and Lam and Wantchekon (2003),
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suggest that natural resource wealth hinders democracy by enabling political elites to use
windfalls from a resource boom to lengthen their stay in power, which means, more limited
scope for democratic change. According to Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2006) politicians
tend to over-extract natural resources because they only care about the future stock of
resources if they remain in power, moreover, they use resource income to influence election
outcomes by offering employment in the public sector, which is relatively inefficient.
Boschini et al. (2012) argue that the resource
abundance in general are helpful for growth only if the quality of a country’s institutional
framework is high enough to curb the rent seeking behaviour of political and economic actors
and, to counter corruption, which are the determining the adverse effects of the resource
abundance.
Moreover, other strand in the literature of resources and institutions finds that the type
of resources matters. For example Bulte, Damania, and Deacon (2005) find that the so-called
“Point-Source” or concentrated resources such as oil and some particular minerals undermine
institutional quality, rather than diffuse resources such as agricultural resources. In his
examination on the impact of natural resources on democracy (measured by electoral rights
and civil liberties), Barro (1999) found that oil has a negative impact on democracy, but nonfuel minerals did not. Like Barro (1999), Leite and Weidmann (1999) demonstrated that
resource abundance, particularly fuel and ores increase rent seeking measured by the level of
corruption, and that corruption in turn hamper economic growth. Isham and others (2005) also
find that ”point source” natural resources like oil and minerals, in addition to plantation crops
such as coffee and cocoa, are damaging for a country’s institutional capacities , while diffuse
resources do not. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) found that the abundance of point
sources natural resources have an indirect negative impact on growth through the quality of
institutions. Further, the authors also argued that the abundance of oil has a negative and
significant effect in the rule of law as a measure of institutions.
Most recently, empirical evidence shows that oil resource rents lead to more
corruption. More specifically, Arezki and Bruckner (2009) examine the effects of oil rents on
corruption for a panel of 30 oil-exporting countries between 1992 and 2005. They find that an
increase in oil rents significantly increases corruption, particularly in countries with a high
share of state participation in oil production. Similarly, Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2009)
found that resource rents significantly increase corruption when the quality of democratic
institutions is relatively poor. Arezki and Gylfason (2011) examine the effect of the
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interaction between resource rents and democracy on corruption for a panel of 29 SubSaharan countries during the period from 1985 to 2007. They find that natural resource rents
lead to more corruption, but only in less democratic countries.
The resource curse literature also contains a number of studies that suggest that natural
resources wealth tend to favor civil conflict and influences their duration and intensity
(Collier and Hoeffler, 1998).
As discussed above, it is clear that certain types of natural resources, particularly oil,
have a negative impact on the quality of both economic and political institutions, and that
institutions in turn are important determinant of growth and development. This implies that
without effective institutional framework, resource rich countries may not be able to
overcome the problems related to the resource curse.
Discussing institutions, Acemoglu et al. (2005, p.389) state that: “Without property
rights, individuals will not have the incentive to invest in physical or human capital or adopt more
efficient technologies. Economic institutions are also important because they help to allocate
resources to their most efficient uses, they determine who gets profits, revenues and residual rights
of control…... Societies with economic institutions that facilitate and encourage factor
accumulation, innovation and the efficient allocation of resources will prosper “.

3. Algeria: oil dependence, failed diversification and the role of institutional framework
A large number of studies suggest that the great challenges facing by the most oil
producing countries are: to overcome their dependency on oil and to diversify their
economies. However, Algeria, like many other well-endowed countries, has totally failed to
competitively diversify the economy away from the hydrocarbons, despite the multiplicity of
economic reforms, and the substantial amount of revenues allocated to the economy. In fact,
the resource curse literature links the failure of development in the majority of developing
natural resource abundant states, like Algeria, to the weaknesses of their institutional and
governance arena. Whether that be the fundamental reason or not, there is no doubt that
Algeria’s institutional environment have several shortcomings.

3.1. Algeria: The structural dependence on hydrocarbons:
Algeria is one of the major exporters of oil and gas in Africa. It is the 14th largest
world exporter of oil, and is the sixth-largest gas producer. Algeria’s proven crude oil reserves
are estimated at 12.2 billion barrels, as of January, 1, 2013, which is equivalent to about 20
years of current production. Algeria’s proven natural gas reserves are estimated of about
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159.1 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), as of January 2013, the ninth largest natural gas reserves in the
world and the second largest in Africa. According to US Energy Information Administration
Algeria also holds vast unexploited shale gas resources located in eastern Algeria in
Ghadamas Basin.
The hydrocarbons sector is the locomotive of the Algerian economy, the contribution
of oil sector in Gross Domestic Product has not ceased to rise, jumping from less than 15% in
1969 to more than 43.6 % in 2011, the share of hydrocarbon fiscal revenues in total
government revenues rose from 21 percent in 1970 to more than 68 percent in 2013.
Furthermore, public investment has played an important role in economic development
since Algeria’s independence in 1962 and, more recently after the extraordinary oil windfall
for the early 2000s.
As a result of the recent oil windfall, the Algerian government has implemented a
series of substantial public investment programs (2001-2004, 2005-2009, and 2010-2014).
Between 2001 and 2004, the government implemented the first public investment program
(Economic Recovery Program), worth about DA 525 million (US$7 billion), followed by a
second program known as Complementary Plan for Growth Support (Programme
Complémentaire de Soutien à la Croissance) for 2005-2009, with initial allocation of DA
4,203 billion (roughly US$55 billion), which has increased to about DA 8,705 billion
(approximately US$114 billion) in the late June 2006 (World Bank 2005). On the mid 2010
the Algerian government has announced the third public investment program for 2010-2014
with an investment amounting to 21,214 billion Algerian dinars (around US$286 billion).
However, the substantial public investment efforts lunched by the government, have
enabled Algeria to maintain respectable levels of economic growth since 2002. In parallel,
unemployment rate fell by half in five years, from 30 percent in 2001 to 15.3 percent in 2005
and 10 percent in 2012.Since 1996, annual inflation rate decrease from 22 percent to 4.5
percent in 1997 and 4 percent in 2012. Due to the significant accumulation of its foreign
exchange reserves, at the end of 2006, acceleration of advance payments enabled the
government to reimburse more than USD 10.5 billion of their external debt. These repayments
brought a substantial reduction in Algeria’s external debt from USD 17.19 billion in 2005 to
less than USD 5 billion at the end of 2012 (see Table 1 ).
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Table.1 Algeria: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators

2000

2005

2010

2014

2015

Growth rate

2.2

5.1

3.3

3.8

2.9

Unemployment rate

29.5

15.2

10

10.6

11.4

Inflation rate

0.33

1.64

3.9

3.3

4.5

25.2

17.2

5.16

5.28

4.86

External

debt

(in

USD billions)

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI)

As shown in the Table 1 above, large public investment in all sectors of the economy
has helped to get a significant growth rates, and contributed to reduction in unemployment
during this decade, however, compared to the volume of investment during this same period,
the contribution of public investment to economic growth seems low than expectations for the
country. Algeria has invested an average annual rates of 10 percent of GDP to get less than
4.5 percent as an average annual rate of growth between 2001-2007.This poor contribution of
public expenditure in economic growth confirms that not all the investments undertaken in
Algeria in this period were productive, and confirms also that Algeria losses more than 5
percent of the value of their economy annually. Moreover, According to Albino-War and
others (2014), Algeria’s investment efficiency is weak compared to other oil exporters in the
region and well below the global average. Algeria’s investment efficiency score of 0.29 (in
terms of investment quantity) suggests that, under ideal circumstances, Algeria could have
built up to 71 percent more infrastructure with the same amount of investment.

With regard to the enormous financial resources allocated to the different sectors of
the economy under the public investment programs for 2001-2014, the Algerian economy is
still poorly diversified, and the contribution of the non-oil sector in to total GDP remains
weak, compared to the hydrocarbon sector.
In fact, Algerian government must ensure the good quality and efficiency of public
expenditure which plays a key role in the Algerian economy, By Assuring greater
transparency in government finance which are essential for controlling the rapid increase of
expenditures. Moreover the government must ensure sound selection of projects to improve
the overall effectiveness of public investment program.
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3.2. Algeria: The failed economic diversification:
The most important challenge facing the Algerian economy since independence has
been its excessive and increasing dependence on the hydrocarbon sector. Despite the
multiplicity of economic reforms pursued by successive Algerian governments - since
independence - to diversify the economy away from the oil and gas sectors, the Algerian
economy maintains the same characteristics of an economy depending primarily on the
production and export of oil, and consequently all these efforts have failed to establish a
sustainable economy, and to promote private sector-led, non-hydrocarbon growth. Today,
Algerian economy is among the least diversified in the world. In the late of 1960 and early
1970s Algeria’s non-hydrocarbon exports represented 40 percent of total exports; in recent
years, they barely exceeded the symbol level of 3 percent, and remain too weak (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Algerian Exports 1966-2013 (Percent of Total Exports)
120
100
80
Hydrocarbond exports

60

Non-Hydrocarbon exports

40
20

19
66
19
69
19
72
19
75
19
78
19
81
19
84
19
87
19
90
19
93
19
96
19
99
20
02
20
05
20
08
20
11

0

Source: World Development Indicator database

In Algeria, the structural dependence on hydrocarbons is the result of the failures of
reform policies, notably in terms of post-independence agricultural reforms, the vast
industrialization program launched by the government in the 1970s and early 1980s, and the
privatization process for government-owned enterprises under the structural adjustment
reforms in the 1990s. The failure of these attempts at integrated the Algerian economy into
the world economy, can be attributed in large part to the political opposition to economic
reforms, bad governance and rent seeking behaviour (Auty, 2003, Hakim Darbouche, 2011).
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3.3. The institutional environment in Algeria:
The analysis of Algeria’s institutional framework demonstrates a high degree of
perceived weakness. A comparison based on the World Bank’s governance indicators for
Algeria with other successful resource-rich countries like Norway, Chile, Malaysia and
Botswana, indicates that Algeria is placed well below the level of governance in these
successful mineral-rich countries in all six governance indicators (Voice and Accountability,
Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control
of Corruption ) (see Table 2 below).

Table 2. Comparison of governance indicators in Algeria with some successful mineral-rich

countries, year 2014

Algeria

Voice and

Political

Government

accountability

stability

effectiveness

-0.93

-1.17

-0.51

Regulatory

Rule

Control

quality

of law

of corruption

-1.21

-0.73

-0.61

Successful mineral-rich countries
Botswana

0.44

1.02

0.32

0.64

0.63

0.80

Chile

1.06

0.49

1.14

1.50

1.43

1.48
2.23

Norway

1.71

1.13

1.81

1.64

2.05

Malaysia

-0.33

0.34

1.14

0.84

0.64

0.48

Source: World Bank (2014), Governance Research Indicators dataset.
Note: All scores lie between -2.5(weak) and 2.5(strong) governance performance.

In addition, a study by the World Bank (2005) about the legal framework for business
and private sector development in Algeria, concludes that the Algeria’s institutional
framework is largely underdeveloped. This report notes that : “ The Algeria’s legal framework
is still characterized by partial inadequacies in standards and regulations applicable to
business, notably those related to: a) the creation and operation of commercial firms; b)
competition rules and transparency rules in commercial transactions; c) guarantees; d)
property rights; and e) rules governing bankruptcy and liquidation “(World Bank , 2005,
Algerie , Le Droit des Affaires et le Developpement du Secteur Privé en Algerie, P.i)
Furthermore, this negative assessment of economic and political institutional
framework in Algeria is corroborated by a variety of international nongovernmental
organizations (INGOs). In a report published in 2013, Economic Freedom of the World
(EFW) point out that: “Institutional weaknesses continue to undermine prospects for
sustained long-term economic development in Algeria”. According to the 2013 index of
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Economic Freedom of the World (Heritage Foundation), Algeria ranks 145nd out of 179
countries. In regional comparison, Algeria ranked only 14th among the 15 countries in the
Middle East and North Africa region, its economic freedom score is 49.6, remains the lower
than the regional and world averages, also, this report attributes this mediocre ranking
particularly to widespread corruption and inefficient judicial system which is vulnerable to
political inference. In essence, Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) notes, “Algeria’s
political institutions are largely undemocratic and military involvement in politics is
common”. Freedom House categorizes Algeria as “not free” in its political rights and civil
liberties measure (Terry 2013).
A large body of empirical international research shows that high level of corruption
is more likely in countries with weak institutional environment. As Algeria is a country with
rich endowment of natural resource, characterized by a major institutional and governance
weaknesses, the level of corruption in Algeria has reached epidemic proportions at the state
level and different levels of the administration. According to Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI, which measures the perceived level of public sector
corruption) Algeria ranked 100th out of 175 countries in transparency in 2014. As a result,
Algeria is still listed as one of the most corrupt places in the world.For instance, Freedom
House comments, “high levels of corruption plague Algeria’s business and public sectors”. In
this sense, Limam M. (2012) shows that the major corruption and scandals have been linked
to officials branches and persons of the state, which means that corruption in Algeria is de
facto political. In fact inefficient government bureaucracy (18.4 %), corruption (16.0 %) and
access to financing (19.2%) are the most problematic factors that severely hamper Algeria’s
economy competitiveness according to the 2011 – 2012 Global Competitiveness Report
(World Economic Forum).
Furthermore,

the

World

Bank’s

Business

Enterprise

Surveys

(2002-2008)

demonstrates that courts system, corruption and bribery are the biggest obstacles experienced
by the private sector firms in Algeria. As can be seen in the Table below, around 66.6 percent
of respondents in Algeria report that they expect to have to make informal payments to public
officials to get things done, compared to an average of 35.8 percent for the MENA region and
24 percent for all countries (The survey covered 100,000 businesses in over 100 countries).
About 64.3 – 30 percent of firms in Algeria also identifying corruption and courts system as a
major constraint faced their business, compared to an average of 35.8 – 18 percent for all
countries.
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Table 3. Corruption constraints
Obstacle for firms

Algeria

MENA

All countries

Percent of firms expected to give gifts to secure government contract

34.8

32.4

22.6

Percent of firms expected to give gifts to get an import license

34.9

34.1

13.5

Percent of firms expected to give gifts to public officials "to get things done"

66.6

35.8

24.0

Percent of firms identifying corruption as a major constraint

64.3

60.0

35.9

Percent of firms identifying the courts system as a major constraint

29.3

23.4

18.0

Source: World Bank Business Enterprise Survey Database, the data are available online at http:
www.entreprisesurveys.org.data (accessed 12. 01. 2016)

As discussed above, Algeria’s institutional framework has several shortcoming. Algeria’s
current political and economic institutions are rooted in its history, specifically with that of
French colonialism. The Algerian post-colonial socialist and collectivist ideology, and the
political economy of oil rents management are two other factors that have profound effects on
the current institutional environment of Algeria.
 Algeria was one of the French colonies, it gained its independence in 1962, after 130
years of occupation. In general, the French colonial rule in Algeria was an authoritarian
military regime, relied primarily on land confiscation, the exclusion and the marginalization
of the great majority of Algerians. The French rule dispossessed the Algerian populations of
its freedom and wealth (Shabafrouz, 2010). Thus, Algeria’s political institutions under French
rule (1830-1962) were highly undemocratic (Terranova, 2011). Consequently, the postcolonial Algerian state inherited a narrow institutions from the colonial era. The Algerian
regime after independence was essentially authoritarian in character and there was no
democratic institutions. Rather, the strategy of politico-military elites of Algeria’s postcolonial ruling party, the National Liberation Front imitated oppressive French military rule.
In addition, state elites suffer from the effects of the “gangrene of corruption” even under the
leadership of president Houari Boumediene (1965-1978) who exercised a relatively tough
hand against corrupt practices (Whlie and Taylor, 2001).
 The management of the Algerian economy under socialist orientation for more than
two decades has generated many dysfunctions in the behaviours of the population, and in the
management of the public sector enterprises. In this context, the nomination process for
managers of the enterprises and other responsibilities were chosen according to the
relationship with the politicians, not with regard to the professional qualifications.
Furthermore, rent-seeking behaviour has been encouraged, and become a part of the common
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characteristics of the behaviour of Algerian society. Werenfels (2002) shows that, before
economic liberalisation “many state owned enterprises became traders and intermediaries
more than producer”, this reflects the extent to which Algeria’s economic sector was
particularly affected by rent seeking behaviour. Further, corruption practices constituted
major rules of the game in both political and economic sectors. This situation has been
exacerbated during the phase of transition toward market economy, with the privatization
process for government-owned corporations and trade regime liberalization, which were
officially launched in the early 1990s. For instance, trade liberalization was at the origin of the
emergence of a powerful import lobby (interest groups) close to the state elites, who benefits
from import monopolies, which represents a better source of rents for them, and that those
profiting from such rents, that distorted the reform process (privatisation process), Because a
successful privatisation and efficient enterprise poses a threat to those receiving rents from
import monopolies (Werenfels, 2002). In addition, the process of privatization of state-owned
companies favoured larger businessmen with government connections and those in the upper
echelons of the state who set regulations to facilitate their entry. This increased corruption,
which worsened the business environment and curb private smaller firms that lacked political
support (Auty, 2008).
 Moreover, the easy access of the country to the oil resources that become the main
resources of the export sector has exacerbated institutional weaknesses. As a rentier state in
hydrocarbons, Algeria’s ruling clans are the major beneficial from the oil revenues, which
distribute the rents to their cronies, thus creating a system characterized by a various interest
group compete with each other over the possession of the oil rents and the distribution of
political power and patronage. With internal struggles between various powerful groups, no
one clan able to control the system alone, so, most policy undertaken are shaped to balance
these interests. Moreover, these conflict within the ruling regime extended to the political
elites and other responsible at the regional and local levels, leading to a large distortion in
state institutions. This in turn inhibits any real attempt to build effective institutions to make
success reform process such as privatisation and economic diversification policies, in order to
resolve the dependence on hydrocarbons in Algeria.

4. Data and methodology:
4.1. Model and data:
In the resource curse literature, the institutional quality channel has frequently been
considered as an important cause of the curse in many countries, especially where growth has
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been concentrated on the extraction of natural resources. This study examine the association
between institutional quality and natural resource rents for the Algerian economy. We
examine this relationship using Corruption index as a measure of institutional quality.
According to Sachs and Warner, 1997; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004, institutional quality is
often simply controlled for by using a measure of corruption. The time series data used in this
study is annual data spanning the period from 1984 to 2013.
Our empirical model is based on Arezki and Bruckner (2009), in which the empirical linkage
between natural resource rents and institutional quality (corruption) use the following model:

Corruptiont     Oil rentst  X t  ut ........(1)

In this equation, institutional quality variable is proxy by corruption index taken
from the dataset constructed by Political Risk Services (International Country Risk Guide
governance indicators, 2013). According to ICRG’s definition, corruption index intends to
measure corruption “ within the political system “, and, “is more concerned with actual or
potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, ‘favor-for
favors’, secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business “. The
ICRG corruption score ranges from 1 to 6, with higher values indicating less corruption, and
lower score means higher corruption.
A measure of natural resource abundance: the natural resource rents was proxy by oil
rents as a percentage of GDP (Oil rents), which measures the difference between world prices
of oil and the average unit extraction costs. The oil rents aggregate covers oil and gas. The
data were extracted from 2013 World Development Indicators of the World Bank.
The other control variables (Xt) that we include in our empirical analysis, are : the
interaction term (Interaction) between institutions and resource abundance : oil rents 
Democratic accountability , the interaction of natural resource abundance with institutions
was used by Mehlum and al.(2006) , and Arezki and Bruckner (2009) to argue that highquality democratic institutions could reduce corruption ; the manufactures exports as a
percentage of total exports (Manexp), which controls for the change in income unrelated to
the oil sector. The data on manufactures exports is taken from World Bank (World
Development Indicators database,2013), while the data on democratic accountability score is
obtained from the PRS group on governance.
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4.2. Methodology of the study:
In order to examine long run relationship and dynamic interaction among natural
resource abundance and institutions, this study employs the cointegration analysis. The first
step of our econometric methodology is to investigate the order of integration of each series,
that is the stationarity of our variables. In this study two types of unit root tests are conducted:
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, and the Phillips and Perron (1988) unit roots test. The
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) is used to select the order of the ADF regression. The
second step is to test for cointegration. The cointegration procedure was used to test the
existence of long-run equilibrium relationship among the variables. There are many possible
tests for this purpose, but the most general of them is the multivariate test based on the vector
autoregressive representation of Johansen’s maximum likelihood estimation approach
(Johansen and Juselius, 1990).Then, the short run analysis is examined through Generalized
Impulse Response Function (GIRF) and Generalized variance decomposition analysis (VDC),
which are invariant to the ordering of the variables. The GIRF allows us to examine the
dynamic effects of shocks to a particular variable on the other variables. The Generalized
Variance Decomposition Analysis (VDC) apportions the variance of forecast errors in a given
variable to its own shocks and those of the other variables in the system.

5. Empirical Results and discussion:
Before delving into the analysis of estimation results, we analyze the partial
correlation between corruption and oil rents. Partial correlation measures the degree of
association between the two variables, with the exclusion of the effect of other controlling
variables. The figure 2 below displays the simple correlations in the scatter plot.

Figure 2. Corruption versus oil rents, (partial relation).
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However, a careful look at the scatter plot shows that corruption is associated
negatively with oil rents (as a percentage of GDP), because lower PRS corruption score
indicates high levels of corruption. To clarify this relationship, we resort to the cointegration
analysis results.

5.1. Stationarity / Unit root:
Cointegration analysis necessities that the variables under consideration be integrated
of the same order. Hence, it is necessary to investigate the order of integration of the
individual time series before cointegration analysis. We employ ADF test, and Phillips-Perron
test statistics. We run the test both in level and first differences. The results of unit root tests
are reported in Table 4. In this study, these tests give the same results, namely that each of
these series is I(1), that is they are integrated of order 1.

Table 4. Unit root tests
Augmented Dickey Fuller unit roots test
Level

Variable
Intercept

ADF

CV

First difference

Intercept and trend

Intercept

ADF

ADF

CV

ADF

CV

Decision

Intercept and trend

CV

Corruption

-1.8639

-2.9385

-.72634

-3.5098

-3.4766

-3.0422

-4.5889

-3.5950

I(1)

Oil rent

-1.6590

-3.1472

-1.5994

-3.5692

-3.9750

-3.0449

-4.1925

-3.7128

I(1)

Manexp

-2.2355

-3.0422

-2.9590

-3.5950

-5.8003

-3.1472

-5.6457

-3.5692

I(1)

Interaction

-2.0018

-3.1472

-2.4464

-3.5692

-3.4929

-3.0449

-4.1079

-3.7638

I(1)

Phillips- Perron unit roots test
Variable

Level

First difference
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Intercept and trend
Intercept

ADF

CV

ADF

Intercept

CV

Intercept and trend

ADF

CV

ADF

CV

Corruption

-.82675

-2.9447

-2.1780

-3.6101

-5.8423

-2.8452

-6.1737

-3.6278

I(1)

Oil rent

-1.3242

-2.9447

-2.4774

-3.5572

-5.6165

-2.9099

-5.5125

-3.6890

I(1)

Manexp

-2.7730

-2.8452

-2.9584

-3.6278

-6.5346

-2.9447

-6.5142

-3.5572

I(1)

Interaction

-1.7400

-2.9447

-2.4084

-3.5572

-4.5255

-2.9099

-4.4417

-3.6890

I(1)

Notes : The sample period runs from 1986 to 2013.CV gives the 95 percent simulated critical values.

5.2. Cointegration and long run analysis:
Since all series are integrated of order one, cointegration can be investigated using the
Johansen cointegration approach. Johansen and Juselius (1990) develop two test statistics:
Trace statistics ((λtrace) and maximum eigenvalue statistic (λmax). However, before
proceeding to the cointegration test of long run relationship, we have to determine the lag
orders of the variables.For this purpose the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) are applied to the VAR model. Optimal lag for the VAR
model of our study is two lag. The results are reported in table 5 followed by their
interpretation.

Table 5. Johansen-Juselius test results based on the trace and the maximum eigenvalue
statistic
(a) Maximal eigenvalue statistic
Null

Alternative

Statistic

95% Critical Value

90% Critical Value

r=0

r=1

31.6435**

28.2700

25.8000

r<= 1

r=2

12.7473

22.0400

19.8600

r<= 2

r=3

9.3562

15.8700

13.8100

r<= 3

r=4

4.3465

9.1600

7.5300

(b) Trace statistic
Null

Alternative

Statistic

95% Critical Value

90% Critical Value

r=0

r>= 1

58.0934 **

53.4800

49.9500

r<= 1

r>= 2

26.4500

34.8700

31.9300

r<= 2

r>= 3

13.7027

20.1800

17.8800

r<= 3

r=4

4.3465

9.1600

7.5300

Notes: ** and * denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 95% and 90% confidence level respectively .
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Both the trace and the maximum eigenvalue statistics indicate the presence of one
cointegrating vector at 5 and 10 % significant level. We therefore conclude that there is a long
run relationship between the independent variables, namely oil rents as a share of GDP (Oil
rents), interaction terms (Oil rents*democratic accountability), manufactures exports
(Manexp), and the dependent variable corruption (Corruption).
The results of estimated long run corruption equation (based on one cointegration
relation) are reproduced in Table 6.

Table 6: Cointegration equation normalized with respect to Corruption
Dependent variable is PRS Corruption score
Variables

coefficient

Std-error

T-statistics

Oil rents

- 0.16485**

0.016506

- 9.987

Manexp

- 0.10649**

0.03893

- 2.789

Oilrents*Demo.Accountability

0.013613**

0.003415

3.985

6.1233**

0.46941

13.044

Constant

Notes: ** and * denote significant at 95% and 90% confidence level respectively. Asymptotic standard errors are reported in
the parentheses. Vector 1 represents the cointegrating vector for corruption equation.

The cointegration test results show that the effect of oil rents (% of GDP) on
corruption is highly negative and significant. Thus, this evidence suggests that an increase in
oil rents rise levels of corruption in Algeria. This implies that a one percentage increase in the
unit export value of oil increases corruption by about 0.16 percent. This finding is consistent
with Arezki and Brucker’s (2009) finding, who have provided evidence of the adverse link
between oil rents and corruption ( because lower PRS corruption scores indicates high
corruption) for a panel of 31 oil-exporting countries during the period 1992 to 2005.
It can also be noticed from the results in table 6, that the coefficient of manufacturing
exports is negative and statistically significant. This negative association reflect that even the
non oil sector (the manufacturing sector) increase corruption in Algeria.
However, the interaction term between our measure of oil rents and democratic
accountability score is quantitatively small, positive and statistically significant, which is in
line with the empirical institutions literature findings Mehlum, Moene and Torvik ,2006b ;
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Boschini et al.,2012); therefore, a positive coefficient of interaction term between resource
abundance and institutional quality means that increasing democratic accountability of
government could reduce widespread corruption in Algeria.

5.3. Short-Run Dynamics:
After finding the long run relationship between the variables of our model based on
Johansen-Juseluis(1990) cointegration test, in what follows we examine the short run
dynamics responses of both corruption and manufactures exports to shocks in oil rents.

5.3.1. Persistence Profile Analysis:
We use Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs), and Generalized Variance
Decompositions Analysis (VDCs) as they are invariant to the ordering of the variables in the
VAR model (Pesaran and Shin, 1998). However, before considering the impulse response
analysis we consider the Persistence Profile analysis developed by Pesaran and Shin (1996).
The value of this profile is equal to unity on impact, but must tend to zero as N   , if the
long run relationship is cointegrating.
The persistence profile for the long run relation (Figure 3) indicates that if the whole
cointegrating relationship is shocked, it will take about three years for the equilibrium to be
restored.

Figure 3: Persistent Profile of the effect of a System-Wide Shocks to the cointegrating
relation
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5.3.2. Generalized Impulse Responses:
Figure 4 gives the GIRF’s of the two variables, namely the PRS corruption score, and
manufactures exports to a positive unit shock (equal to one standard error) to oil rents.
As can be seen, a shock to oil rents leads to a significant increase in corruption in Algeria by
approximately 15 percent (lower PRS corruption scores indicates high corruption).
The manufactures exports significantly decline in the aftermath of oil rents shock, a
pattern consistent with the Dutch Disease phenomenon, which refers to the appreciation of a
state’s real exchange rate due to a sharp increase in exports of oil. This appreciation, in turn
diminishes the competitiveness of the manufacturing and other non resource sectors, results in
a decline in non resource exports.

Figure 4. Generalized impulse responses of a positive unit shock to oil rents

The PRS Corruption score

The manufactures exports

22

Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies
Proceedings of Middle East Economic Association
Vol. 19, Issue No. 2, Septembre 2017

5.3.3. Generalized Variance Decomposition Analysis:
In Table 7, the corruption variance decomposition analysis reveals that the variance in
corruption is explained by its own variance, which accounts for approximately 85% in the
first year period, and about 60% in the five year period. It can also be noticed from the table
7, that oil rents shocks explain for about 10% of changes in corruption for the first year after
shock, increasing to about 25% in the five year after shock. However, the contribution of the
non-oil manufacturing exports amounts to about 15% in the 5th year period. This finding
therefore, confirms that oil rents shocks explains the largest proportion of the changes in
corruption, while manufacturing exports play a minor role compared to oil rents in explaining
the variance in corruption.

Table 7. Variance decomposition of corruption
Horizon

Corruption

Oil rents

Manexp

oilrents*Dem.acc

1

85.154

09.736

04.396

01.607

2

65.917

20.349

12.245

03.090

3

60.346

23.820

14.963

03.992

4

59.916

24.403

15.442

03.907

5

59.826

24.634

15.550

03.738

6. Policy options:
The major findings of this study pose significant challenges to policy makers in
Algeria.
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1. These results indicate that increase in oil rents tends to exhibit significant large
adverse effects on the level of corruption in Algeria.
2. The high levels of corruption in combination with oil rents exacerbated institutional
weaknesses that weaken the manufacturing and other non-resource sectors in Algeria, and
rendered the Algerian economy increasingly vulnerable to the resource curse.

In light of the forgoing findings, and as seen from the experiences of some resource
abundant countries that have successfully escaped the curse, such as Norway, Chile,
Botswana and Malaysia, several policy options are responsible for such success, but the most
important one being the need to build strong institutional framework. Cross countries studies
also suggest that sound institutional frameworks seem to help overcoming the resource curse,
these literature, therefore argues that political and institutional reforms towards democratic
and good governance in resource abundant countries must precede economic policy reform
(Rosser 2007). Most recently, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) documented that
countries rich in oil resources and poor in political governance and institution pay a
substantial costs for their lack of transparency and accountability. One example of these
countries is Angola. More than US$1 billion of Angola’s state oil revenues are reported to
have missed from government’s accounts each year due to corruption (Global Witness, 2002).
Moreover, Arezki, Hamilton, and Kazimov (2011) argue that transparency and accountability,
are a critical component for improving the quality of institutions responsible for the
management of natural resources.
In the last ten years, the IMF, the World Bank and a number of International
Nongovernmental Organizations (such as Global Witness, Human Rights Watch, and the
Revenue Watch Institute) have contributed heavily to promote transparency, accountability
and civil society participation in the management of revenues of resource abundant
economies, through many international transparency initiatives (the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative – EITI - is one of such initiatives).
In Algeria, in order to improve the institutional environment, the government has
launched many procedures. For fighting corruption more effectively, in 2006, the public
authorities adopted an anti-corruption law (Law No. 06-01 on the Prevention and the Fight
against Corruption) for moralizing political and economic practices, reinforcing existing anticorruption legislation, and establishing conformity of domestic legislation to the United
Nation convention against corruption (which Algeria ratified in 2004), as well as facilitating
international cooperation with Interpol against this scourge. The new law aimed at enhancing
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transparency in government and public procurement, represses the illicit enrichment of public
official, under the obligation for all public agent to declare their patrimony. Also, the new law
highlight the important role of the civil society, including the media, through informing and
increasing public awareness, and promoting civil society participation in public affairs
management. Moreover, the new law called for the creation of a special anti-corruption
agency. In August 2010, the Government of Algeria created the National Commission for the
prevention and fight against corruption as part of an overall national strategy to battle
corruption.
More recently, the commitment reiterated by President of the republic Abdelaziz
Bouteflika to fight corruption was concretised in the draft revision of the constitution. To this
end, the draft revision of the constitutions called for the establishment of a national body of
prevention and fight against corruption. This body enjoys administrative and financial
autonomy.
The article 173-5 of the draft revision of the Constitution states “a national body of
prevention and fight against corruption will be instituted, an independent administrative
authority under the President of the Republic.”
Despite the creation of this anti-corruption commission, and the passing of several
commitments and laws, there are still serious shortcomings in enforcing such measures, due to
the high inefficient of Algeria’s judicial system. According to some NGO’s such as the world
Economic Forum global competitiveness and human rights watch, the Algerian judicial
system is subject to political inference and the influence of officials and influential
individuals. The global competitiveness report 2012-2013 ranked Algeria 126th out of 139
countries on the independence of the judiciary, below neighbouring countries in North Africa.
In addition, transparency is another important recommendation to overcome the curse, which
Algeria has largely failed to achieve it. According to the Open Budget survey, which assesses
whether governments give information access to the public, Algeria’s OBI 2012 was 13 out of
100, which is well below the average score of 43 for all the 100 countries surveyed, this score
indicates that Algeria’s government provides the public with scant information on the
government budget and financial activities, which makes it difficult for public to overseeing
government management of the public’s money.

7. Conclusion:
The main purpose of this paper was to study the association between natural resource
rent and institutional quality in Algeria. Following the natural resource curse literature, we use
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oil rents as a proxy for natural resource abundance. Institutional quality is measured by two
indicators, extracted from the Political Risk Services (International Country Risk Guide)
corruption and democratic accountability. Our empirical results indicate that an increase in oil
rents significantly increase corruption in Algeria, while the interaction effect between oil rents
and democratic accountability is positive and statistically significant, which means that
enhancing democratic institutions can reduce corruption.
Indeed, two conclusions can be drawn from the above results. First, in Algeria
the abundance of oil resources has exacerbated institutional weaknesses, and corruption.
Second, coupled with weak institutional constraints, oil abundance leads to a heavy
dependence of the Algerian economy on hydrocarbons revenues.
Thus, it is important for Algeria to enhance their economic and political institutions
if it wants to diversify their economy away from hydrocarbon sector. In fact, diversifying
Algeria’s economy is not an impossible task with regard to the huge potential that has the
country. However, before becoming an oil exporting country Algeria had an important
agricultural sector, it was the “Breadbasket” for the Roman empire during the Roman times,
and was supplying many Mediterranean countries of agricultural goods, even during French
colonial period Algeria’s agricultural exports contributed to large shares of total exports ; for
example, in 1959, agricultural exports represented nearly 61% of total exports, while
petroleum and mineral exports reached only 12% of total exports (World Bank, 1964).
Furthermore, the scope of diversification of the Algerian economy should include: the
development of the manufacturing industries, financial sector, in addition to the service and
tourism sectors which play a positive role in export diversification. However, the
development of these sectors of the economy requires the existence of a strong institutions.
Thus, the institutional environment in Algeria should have more focus from the policy maker,
this means that Algerian government should accept the reform of the country’s institutional
framework. Specifically, this means fighting corruption, cronyism, increasing the state’s
efficacy, and reforming justice.
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